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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

First, Cucamonga contended that the Regional Board failed to
consider economic factors when implementing the 2002 permit based
on a California Supreme Court holding in City of Burbank v. State Water
Resources ControlBd. that when a regional board is considering whether
to make the pollutant restrictions in a wastewater discharge permit
more stringent than federal law requires, California law allows the
board to take into account economic factors, including wastewater discharger's cost of compliance. This argument failed because Cucamonga provided no evidence that the 2002 permit exceeded federal
requirements, and there was evidence that the Regional Board took
into account economic factors when implementing the 2002 permit.
Secondly, Cucamonga asserted that the 2002 permit violated §
402(k) of the Clean Water Act. This assertion stated that the 2002
permit does not include "safe harbor" language. "Safe harbor" language would provide that if Cucamonga was in full compliance with
the permit conditions, it could not be found in violation of Clean Water Act. The trial court held that there was no statutory right to a "safe
harbor" provision to be included as a term of the permit, and this
court affirmed.
The court affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding that the
2002 permit's conditions and requirements were appropriate and
properly adopted.
Michael S. Samelson
Mojave Water Agency v. Vernola, No. E032749, 2005 Cal. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 9866, (Ct. App. Cal., Oct. 27, 2005) (affirming the Superior
Court's denial of a motion to vacate as void an earlier judgment imposing a physical solution to an over-drafted basin on overlying pumpers
who defaulted by failing to prove their water rights during the litigation).
In 1990 the City of Barstow and the Southern California Water
Company (collectively "Barstow") filed an action against the City of
Adelanto, the Mojave Water Agency ("MWA") and other upstream
producers regarding the overdraft of the Mojave River Basin and its
damaging impact on Barstow's water supply. MWA filed an amended
cross-complaint naming water producers within the Basin as crossdefendants and requesting that the court apportion water rights
among them. During a stay in the litigation, attorneys and engineers
for water producers throughout the basin met and negotiated a proposed physical solution to the overdraft problem. Most of the parties
stipulated to a judgment incorporating the physical solution and imposing the solution on non-stipulating parties. The Vernolas were part
of a group of cross-defendants who did not stipulate to the proposed
judgment and physical solution ("Cardozo Group").
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The trial court granted MWA's motion to issue and impose the
physical solution on stipulating and non-stipulating parties, set a trial
date, and notified all parties that each defaulting party would be subject to the terms of the stipulated judgment. Counsel for the Cardozo
Group informed the Vernolas of the trial court's actions. Two months
before the trial, the Vernolas withdrew from the Cardozo Group.
Shortly after, the trial court issued a statement indicating that it would
issue a decision as to water rights of those parties who offered evidence
at trial. The trial court found that the Cardozo Group, of which the
Vernolas were no longer a member, did not prove their water rights.
The Vernolas did not present any evidence of their water rights at the
trial. The trial court entered a final judgment on January 10, 1996,
which held the Vernolas to be a defaulting party subject to the stipulated judgment.
In 1997, the Vernolas moved to modify the judgment to increase
their base annual production allowance, claiming a violation of due
process because they had not been present to challenge evidence at
trial. The court denied the motion and the Vernolas did not appeal.
In 1998, the Court of Appeal of California reversed the 1996 judgment
as to the Cardozo Group. In 2000, the Supreme Court upheld the decision and in 2002, the Vernolas moved to vacate the 1996 judgment.
The court denied the motion.
The Vernolas filed their notice of appeal to the California Court of
Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two in November 2002,
contending that the California Supreme Court decision in 2000 compelled a holding that the judgment entered against the Vernolas in
1996 was reversed and void. Alternatively, the Vernolas argued that, if
valid, the judgment should be modified to conform to the Supreme
Court ruling in favor of the Cardozo Group. The court rejected both
arguments and affirmed the trial court's order denying the Vernolas'
motion to vacate.
The court held the 1996 judgment to be valid and final as to all
parties, whether they stipulated to the judgment or objected and appealed, since those appeals were now completed and final or defaulted. The court clarified that while the trial court's determination
regarding the Cardozo Group was a legal error, the judgment was valid
because it was not based on any fraud or lack ofjurisdiction. The court
also held that the trial court's imposition of a physical solution on nonstipulating parties to achieve an equitable remedy to the Mojave River
Basin's overdraft was not an act in excess of its jurisdiction or power
and therefore valid.
The Vernolas also contended that the judgment was void because
they did not need to do anything more than pump water for reasonable beneficial use on their land to preserve their overlying rights. The
Vernolas went on to argue that the overlying rights they failed to defend equitably trump reasons for enforcing the judgment against
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them, and that the court should modify the judgment to treat them in
the same manner as the parties who timely appealed. The court held
that this argument failed to address whether an overlying pumper in
an over-drafted basin should be required to defend an action to adjudicate groundwater rights. The court provided that the trial court's
mistake as to whether the Cardozo appellants had water rights of the
type justifying a physical solution did not excuse the Vernolas from
defending the litigation. The court further noted that the parties to
the litigation were entitled to rely on the finality of a judgment that
survived timely filed post-trial motions and appeals. The court established that although no time limit is placed on a motion to vacate the
judgment as void, and the judgment was not final as to the parties who
appealed, the judgment did become final in July 1996 as to all of the
defaulting parties, which included the Vernolas, for purposes of appeal
and most post-trial motions. The court affirmed the holding of the
Superior court denying the motion to vacate as void the judgment imposing the physical solution.
Robert Stevens

COLORADO
Tatum v. People ex rel. Simpson, 122 P.3d 997 (Colo. 2005) (holding
the water court did not err in enjoining an irrigation ditch user from
violating a statute by failing to maintain a river headgate sufficient to
control the inflow of water at the point of diversion).
On July 2, 2003, the Office of the State Engineer ("State Engineer") inspected the headgate to an irrigation ditch called Dolores
Duran Ditch ("Ditch") at its point of diversion from the Middle Fork of
the Purgatoire River. The State Engineer found that the river
headgate was not controlling the water in the Ditch, which permitted
Jim Tatum ("Tatum") to divert water in excess of his decreed amount.
The State Engineer determined that Tatum was violating a Colorado
statute that required him to maintain a suitable and proper headgate
sufficient to control the inflow of water into the Ditch at all ordinary
stages. Consequently, the State Engineer ordered Tatum to comply by
installing a controllable and lockable headgate at the decreed point of
diversion or a wastegate and waste ditch above the existing measuring
flume. In January 2004, the State Engineer returned to inspect the
Ditch and discovered Tatum had failed to comply with the July order.
The State Engineer filed a complaint in the District Court, Water
Division Two seeking an injunction to prevent Tatum from continuing
to violate the statute. The water court held an evidentiary hearing in
which the water commissioner, the division engineer, and the assistant
division engineer testified that the headgate was unsuitable for control-

